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THE ENUMERATED POWERS OF STATES'
Robert G. Natelson2
"The most numerous objects of legislation belong to the States. Those of the
National Legislature [are] but few."
-Rufus King, at the Federal Constitutional Convention.
3
"1 am, sir, at a loss to know how the state legislatures will spend their time."
-Melancton Smith, at the New York ratifying convention
4
1 Repeatedly-referenced works: the sources listed in this footnote are cited repeatedly in this
Article:
Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The
Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23
(1996) [hereinafter Butler & Macey];
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (1997)
[hereinafter CHEMERINKSY];
JACOB COOKE, TENCH COXE AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1978) [hereinafter COOKE];
Tench Coxe, A Freeman (Essays I and II) in COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN & GARY L.
McDoWELL, FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE "OTHER" FEDERALISTS:
1787-88 (1998) [hereinafter Coxe];
JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (5 vols; 1941 ed. inserted in 2 vols.) [hereinafter
ELLIOT];
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (4 vols.) (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
[hereinafter Farrand];
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS
DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888) [hereinafter Ford,
PAMPHLETS];
A NATION OF STATES: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM (Robert A.
Goldwin ed., 1974) [hereinafter Goldwin];
Alexander Contee Hanson ("Aristides") in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., 1888) [hereinafter Hanson];
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (18 vols.
projected; not all completed) (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter Jensen];
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS (1997) [hereinafter RAKOVE]; and
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST].
2 Professor of Law, The University of Montana; Senior Research Fellow, Initiative and Ref-
erendum Institute; Senior Fellow in Western Studies, the Independence Institute. J.D., Cor-
nell University; A.B. History, Lafayette College. I am grateful for the assistance of the
following individuals and groups: for reviewing the manuscript, Professor Frances Wells,
The University of Montana School of Law; for research assistance, Stacey Gordon, Refer-
ence Librarian, and Varya Petrosyan, Class of 2003, The University of Montana School of
Law; for secretarial assistance, Charlotte Wilmerton, The University of Montana School of
Law.
3 1 Farrand, supra note 1, at 198.
4 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 313.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In constitutional form, the federal government is one of enumerated pow-
ers, and all powers not enumerated are reserved exclusively to the states and the
people.5 The federal government's enumerated powers have been construed so
broadly, however, that the modern student may be pardoned for asking if any-
thing really has been reserved. Even forty years ago, Professor Lindsey Cowen
could say, "As things now stand, there may not be any powers which are 'not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution,' "6 and, of course, the fed-
eral government has grown a good deal since then. Over the past century, the
power to regulate commerce has come to include the power to regulate agricul-
ture,7 the power to tax has become the power to control inheritances, 8 and the
power to spend for the "general Welfare" has enabled the federal government
to create programs to inculcate and educate,9 as well as for many other
purposes. 0
The proffered legal basis for most of this expansion of federal power is the
wording of the original Constitution. Subsequent amendment justifies rela-
tively little of it. This fact, in turn, raises the oft-argued question of whether the
powers granted the federal government in the original Constitution, especially
as modified by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, really encompass such sub-
jects as agriculture, education, health care, and the like.
The drafters of the Constitution chose to enumerate the powers of the fed-
eral government but not, with a few procedural exceptions,'' the exclusive
powers of states. However, that decision should not be understood as implying
that exclusive state powers were narrow, but rather that they were vast. As the
drafters explained, they had decided not to enumerate the states' reserved pow-
ers for the same reasons they had decided not to include a bill of rights: first,
the reserved powers were too extensive to enumerate; 12 second, a discrete list
would encourage the pretense that the federal government could act everywhere
else. "
I The enumeration of federal powers is found primarily in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The
explicit statements of reserved powers are located in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
6 Lindsey Cowen, What is Left of the Tenth Amendment?, 39 N.C. L. REV. 154, 183 (1961).
7 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
8 E.g., through marginal rates of federal estate tax of up to fifty percent. 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 2001(c)(1) (West 2002).
9 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. § 951 (West 1999) (creating National Foundation on the Arts and
the Humanities).
1o United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (the spending power is not limited to direct
grants of legislative power found in other clauses in the Constitution).
I I E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I (states set qualifications for electors for House of
Representatives); id. § 2, cl. 4 (state governors issue writs of election to fill vacancies in
House); id. § 3 (state legislatures choose Senators); id. § 4, cl. I (states have exclusive
power to establish place of choosing Senators); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (states determine manner
of choosing Presidential electors); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (right of states to enter into compacts,
subject to Congressional approval).
12 E.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 87 (James Bowdoin at the Massachusetts ratifying con-
vention); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 149 (James Iredell speaking at the North Carolina ratify-
ing convention).
13 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 436 (James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention). Wilson, speaking of a bill of rights, stated: "If we attempt an enumeration,
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On the other hand, if we did have an enumeration of exclusive reserved
state powers, perhaps it would enable us to understand more precisely the scope
of the granted powers. Such an enumeration also could shed light on basic
principles of American federalism. 4 For example, an enumeration might help
us determine whether it is constitutionally true, as is sometimes claimed, that
growing national economic interdependence justifies more expansive interpre-
tation of federal powers. Put another way, an enumeration could help us deter-
mine whether the presence of externalities - spill-over effects - from one state
to another creates a constitutionally defensible reason for further central
control.
In point of fact, leading federalists left in the historical record some rather
specific enumerations of the reserved powers of states. They offered these lists
as part of the basis of the political bargain by which the Constitution was rati-
fied. As such, these lists help us divine the actual meaning of such phrases as
"general Welfare"' 5 and "Commerce ... among the several States."' 6
Surprisingly, there has been almost no attention in the legal literature' 7 to
the federalists' enumeration of state powers for the benefit of the ratifying pub-
lic. In this Article, I distill the essence of these enumerations for the modem
reader. After doing so, I conclude that the listed items strongly suggest that a
guiding principle of American federalism is a Coasean one: externalities and/or
interdependence, without more, generally do not serve as constitutional justifi-
cations for further centralization.
II. THE ADOPTION PROCESS: TOWARD CENTRALIZATION AND BACK AGAIN
An overreaching federal government was not, of course, the big problem
facing the country when the constitutional convention gathered in Philadelphia
in May 1787. The delegates convened in order to craft a proposal to rein in
every thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be given. The consequence is, that an
imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the scale of the government, and
the rights of the people would be rendered incomplete." Id. See also id. at 453-54 (Wilson);
3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 620 (James Madison commenting at the Virginia ratifying con-
vention); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 140-41 (William MacLeane speaking at the North Caro-
lina ratifying convention); id. at 142 (Gov. Samuel Johnston speaking at the same
convention); id. at 316 (Gen. C.C. Pinkney speaking in the South Carolina legislature) (con-
sidering calling a ratifying convention); 8 Jensen, supra note 1, at 231-32 (George Lee
Turberville) (writing, "I am satisfied that an enumeration of those priviledges which we
retained - wou'd have left floating in uncertainty a number of non enumerated contingent
powers and priviledges - either in the powers granted or in those retained - thereby indispu-
tably trenching upon the powers of the states").
1' Then Professor (now Judge) Jay S. Bybee compared the task of identifying exclusive
state powers solely from the Constitution's grants of federal powers to understanding reality
from the mere shadows on the wall of Plato's cave. Jay S. Bybee, The Tenth Amendment
Among the Shadows: On Reading the Constitution in Plato's Cave, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 551 (2000).
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
'7 I have been able to find an occasional enumeration of specific state powers, but without
citations to historical references. E.g., Malcolm B. Montgomery, States' Rights Under the
Federal Constitution, 20 Miss. L.J. 336, 339 (1949). Also, a noted historian has discussed
briefly one enumeration, that of Tench Coxe. RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 192.
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centrifugal forces that immediately impaired the capacity of the new nation to
function on the world stage - and, ultimately, might tear it apart. The present
perils of extreme decentralization, coupled with the understandable influence of
British precedents, help explain why the first instinct of convention leaders was
to propose a "consolidated" rather than a "foederal [sic]" union.
The consolidationist vision was embodied in the Virginia Plan, so-called
because it was proposed by the Virginia delegation, under the guidance of Gov-
ernor Edmund Randolph and by James Madison. In effect, this was a scheme
in which the states would survive only as "corporations," fulfilling the kind of
subordinate roles that local government played in England. 8 One delegate,
George Read of Delaware, proposed abolishing the states entirely. 9 Most of
the delegates believed, however, that the states should be preserved, if merely
for instrumental reasons: the general government simply could not "extend its
care to every requisite object" 20 over such a large territory.
The Virginia plan served as the basis of discussion during the first few
weeks of the convention. By its terms, it would bestow on the new government
the cumulative total of powers (1) that Congress had enjoyed under the Confed-
eration, (2) in which "the separate states are incompetent," and (3) necessary to
"the harmony of the United States." In addition, Congress would receive (4) a
plenary veto over state legislation.2 ' At this stage, proposals for a more limited
list of federal powers were dismissed as impractical.22 Thus, when the New
Jersey delegation offered its own, more decentralized proposal on June 16,
1787, the delegates rejected it by a decisive vote. The delegates further
appeared willing to grant the new government even the power to interfere with
the "internal police" (internal governance) of states. When Roger Sherman
suggested that the states ought to retain power over such matters, Gouverneur
Morris responded that, in some cases, they ought not even have that power;
23
and when Sherman introduced his proposal in the form of a motion, the con-
vention rejected it.
24
The date on which the convention rejected Sherman's motion - July 17,
1787 - marked the high tide of nationalization. The important fact for present
purposes was that the constitutional bargain was not finalized until the tide of
nationalization had ebbed over the ensuing four years.
Some delegates, of whom Roger Sherman was but one, always had main-
tained that the states should be left with considerable powers.2 ' Later in the
day on July 17, those delegates won their first battle: the convention voted to
18 Some anti-federalists later charged that this was exactly what the Constitution would do.
See, e.g., 4 Jensen, supra note 1, at 277 ("American Herald"); 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 638
(same).
I9 1 Farrand, supra note 1, at 136.
20 Id. at 357 (James Madison).
21 Id. at 21.
22 E.g., id. at 53 (James Madison); id. at 59-60 (Roger Sherman).
23 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 26.
24 Id. at 21, 26.
25 E.g., 1 Farrand, supra note 1, at 86 (John Dickinson); id. at 133 (Roger Sherman) (stating
that criminal and civil jurisdiction should be left with the states); id. at 160 (George Mason);
id. at 165 (Hugh Williamson) (averring that states ought to control their "internal police");
id. (Elbridge Gerry) (opining that control of the militia ought to be a state power).
[Vol. 3:469
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abandon the Congressional veto over state legislation and to replace it with a
general supremacy clause. On July 23, when the draft constitution was submit-
ted to the Committee of Detail, the new government was not yet limited to
enumerated powers; 26 but when the Committee submitted its revision on
August 1, the sweeping language of the Virginia Plan was gone, and an enu-
meration had replaced it. 27 As the convention wore on, some delegates tried to
add powers to the enumeration, but most of these efforts were defeated. When
the convention adjourned, it presented to Congress and to the states a scheme
for a much weaker central government than had been envisioned in the Virginia
Plan. Indeed, one could argue that the final proposal was as dissimilar to the
Virginia Plan as it was to the Articles of Confederation.2 8
Still, the retreat toward localism had not gone far enough for the Constitu-
tion to be politically acceptable. Because the document listed few state powers
and had no bill of rights, many people thought it would create a central govern-
ment stronger than had, in fact, been intended. This misconception offered the
anti-federalists an easy - and perhaps their most effective29 - line of attack.
The Constitution, they said, would lead to a consolidated government because
it granted what seemed to be very broad powers, but did not enumerate what
had been reserved. Anti-federalists assailed three granted powers in particular:
the General Welfare Clause3" (although it had been merely copied from the
Articles of Confederation 3 1 and actually was designed to limit Congressional
power 32) the Taxation Clause 33 (although a fair reading of the document would
limit this to effectuation of Congress' other powers34 ), and the Necessary and
Proper Clause35 (called by one anti-federalist the "Omnipotent Clause,
' 36
26 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 131-32.
27 Id. at 157-59. Cf John C. Hueston, Note: Altering the Course of the Constitutional Con-
vention: The Role of the Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State and Fed-
eral Powers, 100 YALE L.J. 765 (1990). See also RAKOVE, supra note i, at 177-78.
28 Thus, at the South Carolina legislative session that voted to call the state's ratifying con-
vention, Edward Rutledge pointed out that the powers under the new Constitution were basi-
cally similar to those under the Confederation, except that the government under the
Constitution would have the power to enforce its decrees. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 299.
For other observations of the similarities between the documents, see 4 Jensen, supra note 1,
at 245-46 (Cumberland GAZErTE); 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 567 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sar-
geant). See also RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 177-79 (citing Madison).
29 COOKE, supra note 1, at 117 (citing the opinion of Tench Coxe).
30 E.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 338 (John Williams) (speaking at the New York ratifying
convention); Letter from Silas Lee to George Thatcher (Jan. 23, 1788), in 5 Jensen, supra
note 1, at 782.
31 THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 263 (Madison).
32 Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in
Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. - (forthcoming 2003); FORREST McDONALD,
Novus ORDO SECLORUM (1985).
33 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note I, at 60 (W. Bodman speaking at the Massachusetts ratify-
ing convention).
34 THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 262-63 (Madison).
35 See, e.g., Objections of the Hon. George Mason to the Proposed Federal Constitution, in
I ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 494, 496; 2 Jensen, supra note 1, at 426 (Robert Whitehill speak-
ing at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 8 Jensen, supra note 1, at 323, 324 (William
Russell) (claiming that clause gives Congress plenary power).
36 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 846 ("The Republican Federalist VI").
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although, as Hamilton and many others convincingly pointed out, that clause
added not a jot of substantive power to the central store).3 7
Despite the technical weakness of the skeptics' position, they had grasped
certain psychological and social truths that the federalists did not understand -
or at least purported not to understand. The anti-federalists predicted that, over
the long term, the extremely clever sorts who would cleave to the national
authority (the Hamiltons, the Morrisses, and their counterparts who spin most
modern constitutional theories38 ) would create strong pressure to construe the
central government's granted powers expansively.39 Future promoters of fed-
17 THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 202. See also RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 180 (stating that the
framers did not think this clause augmented Federal powers). At the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention, federalist Thomas McKean claimed the anti-federalists there finally had con-
ceded this point. 2 ELLIOT, supra note I, at 537. Cf 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 455 (James
Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention) (claiming that the clause applies only to enu-
merated powers); id. at 441 (Edmund Pendleton at the Virginia ratifying convention) (mak-
ing the same point); id. at 443 (George Nicholas at the Virginia ratifying convention); id. at
206 (Edmund Randolph at the Virginia ratifying convention); id. at 463-64 (same, but with
an apparently confused statement that the clause was necessary because of how constitutions
should be interpreted); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 141 (William MacLean speaking at the
North Carolina ratifying convention).
The Supremacy Clause also came under attack. See, e.g., 4 Jensen, supra note 1, at 468
("One of the Common People").
38 Thus, for example, I have with me as I write a book that makes the ingenious argument
that adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment (direct election of Senators) eliminated "the
structural protection" for federalism, and that therefore the courts should no longer protect
state prerogatives from central authority, thus allowing the feds to do pretty much whatever
they want to do. RALPH A. RossuM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE SEVEN-
TEENTH AMENDMENT: THE IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2001). The fact that
such arguments are bunk does not make them any less ingenious - perhaps more so.
Actually, the Founders erected multiple protections for federalism, including the enu-
merated powers concept, most of which survive at least on paper. They explicitly expected
the courts to defend vigorously the integrity of these and other constitutional provisions
against overreaching Congressional legislation; there is no merit to the claims of some that
the Founders did not contemplate judicial review. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in I THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, ch. 17, doc. 22,
available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vich8sl4.html) (last
accessed Apr. 8, 2003); THE FEDERALIST No. 16, at 117 (Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No.
44, at 285-86 (Madison); James Sullivan as "Cassius" in EssAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 43,
46 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 71 (John Steele speaking at the
North Carolina ratifying convention); 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 446, 478, 489 (James Wil-
son speaking at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 541 (Pat-
rick Henry speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention); id. at 548 (Edmund Pendleton
speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention).
39 See, e.g., the comments of William Lenoir at the North Carolina ratifying convention:
There was a very necessary clause in the Confederation, which is omitted in this system. That
was a clause declaring that every power, &c., not given to Congress, was reserved to the states.
The omission of this clause makes the power so much greater. Men will naturally put the fullest
construction on the power given them. Therefore lay all restraint on them, and form a plan to be
understood by every gentleman of this committee, and every individual of the community.
4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 206.
George Turner was an example of a moderate anti-federalist who expressed reserva-
tions about the failure to identify reserved powers more specifically. See Letter to Winthrop
Sargent (Nov. 6, 1787), in 2 Jensen, supra note 1, at 209.
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eral grandeur would point to Article 1, § 9's short enumeration of the powers
denied to the central government as demonstrating that the central government
was otherwise omnipotent.4n Their less-clever country cousins would be better
equipped to resist if they could point to a more extensive enumeration of their
own. 4 Anti-federalists understood that an enumeration gives the concrete-
minded - that is, most of us - some examples to hold onto and to expand by
broad interpretation or by analogy.4 2 "This precious, this comfortable page
will be the ensign, to which on any future contestation . . . the asserters of
liberty may rally, and constitutionally defend it." 3 Subsequent history makes
it hard to argue that the anti-federalists were wrong on this point: today the
explicit enumeration in the first eight amendments offers most of the few
remaining harbors from ubiquitous federal authority. 44
40 See, e.g., 2 Jensen, supra note 1, at 398, 427 (Robert Whitehill speaking at the Penn-
sylvania ratifying convention); Letter from Thomas B. Wait to George Thatcher (Jan. 8,
1788), in 5 Jensen, supra note I, at 646; Letter from Silas Lee to George Thatcher (Jan. 23,
1788), in 5 Jensen, supra note I, at 782; id. at 822 ("Agrippa XIV, Jan. 29, 1788").
" See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note I, at 80 (General Thompson at the Massachusetts ratifying
convention) (stating that, without an enumeration of rights, the Constitution does not state,
"Thus far shall ye come, and no farther."); id. at 338-39 (John Williams speaking at the New
York ratifying convention); 3 ELLIOT, supra note I, at 449 (William Grayson speaking at the
Virginia ratifying convention); 4 ELLIOT, supra note I, at 167 (Timothy Bloodworth speak-
ing at the North Carolina ratifying convention).
Particularly noteworthy are the speeches of Samuel Spencer to the North Carolina rati-
fying convention:
The gentleman said, all matters not given up by this form of government were retained by the
respective states. I know that it ought to be so; it is the general doctrine, but it is necessary that it
should be expressly declared in the Constitution, and not left to mere construction and opinion. I
am authorized to say it was heretofore thought necessary .... With respect to these great essen-
tial rights, no latitude ought to be left.
Id. at 152-53. See also id. at 168:
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman expresses admiration as to what we object with respect to a bill of
rights, and insists that what is not given up in the Constitution is retained. He must recollect I
said, yesterday, that we could not guard with too much care those essential rights and liberties
which ought never to be given up. There is no express negative - no fence against their being
trampled upon. They might exceed the proper boundary without being taken notice of. When
there is no rule but a vague doctrine, they might make great strides, and get possession of so
much power that a general insurrection of the people would be necessary to bring an alteration
about. But if a boundary were set up, when the boundary is passed, the people would take notice
of it immediately.
Other examples of anti-federalist understanding of the relevant psycho-political reality
include 2 Jensen, supra note 1, at 304 ("A Federal Republican, A Review of the Constitu-
tion," Nov. 28, 1787); id. at 393 (Robert Whitehill speaking at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention) (making an argument very similar to Spencer's - and perhaps the source of
Spencer's).
42 Thus, the protection of "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment has expanded into a right
to privacy. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43 8 Jensen, supra note 1, at 220 ("A True Friend," Dec. 6, 1787). See also Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 8 Jensen, supra note I, at 250
(stating that the bill of rights will provide protection "without the aid of sophisms"); George
Lee Turberville to Arthur Lee (Oct. 28, 1787), in 8 Jensen, supra note I, at 127 (stating that
he prefers a bill of rights to "Mr. [James] Wilsons sophism" about reservations of power).
44 Although enforcement of the Second Amendment has been limited and cases under the
Third have rarely arisen, the courts have used the other six to invalidate federal legislation
far more often than they have resorted to the limits of federal enumerated powers. For
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At the time, these anti-federalist arguments seem to have scored heavily
with the general public. Throughout the ratification process, the Constitution's
proponents retained their leadership position in the debate only by conceding
more and more.4 5 The federalist concessions were of three kinds:
(1) They agreed to a specific enumeration of individual rights, i.e., the
first eight amendments, together with a general clause against dispar-
agement of unenumerated rights (the Ninth Amendment).4 6
(2) Key federalists - such as Madison - threw their support behind the
Tenth Amendment, a rule of construction, or "truism,"' 47 clarifying
that what was not granted was denied."8
(3) Influential federalists issued public oral and written reassurances as to
the scope of powers reserved exclusively for the states.
Together, these concessions were designed to create an "original under-
standing" of the Constitution as authorizing only a government of distinctly
curtailed powers."9
III. THE FEDERALIST REASSURANCES REGARDING STATE-RESERVED POWERS
Federalists often made the formal argument that what the Constitution did
not grant to the central government was denied.5 ° In response, anti-federalists
example, of the approximately 1000 pages of text in CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, approxi-
mately two-thirds deal with issues arising mediately or immediately from the Bill of Rights.
All other legislative power issues, including federalism, comprise about eighty pages.
41 Unfortunately, some historians have focused on the story leading up to the climax of
proposed centralization while omitting or truncating the long reversal to decentralization.
See, e.g., Martin Diamond, What the Framers Meant By Federalism, in Goldwin, supra note
I (admitting at the end, however, that a long course of ratification history remained); Wil-
liam P. Murphy, State Sovereignty and the Founding Fathers, 30 Miss. L.J. 135 (1959).
46 Opinion on the scope of the Ninth Amendment is sharply divided, but practically all
writers agree that whatever else it may do, it certainly serves as a rule of construction against
the conclusion that federal power covers the entire field outside the exceptions in the Bill of
Rights. For a collection of views, see THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY
AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989). See especially id.
at 60 (speech by James Madison).
41 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). See generally Walter Berns, The
Meaning of the Tenth Amendment, in Goldwin, supra note 1.
48 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."). For examples of demands for this kind of wording, see 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at
550 (setting forth the resolution of the Maryland ratifying convention); 3 ELLIOT, supra note
1, at 442 (George Mason speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention); 4 ELLIOT, supra
note 1, at 163 (Samuel Spencer addressing the North Carolina ratifying convention); 2 Jen-
sen, supra note 1, at 599 (Robert Whitehill speaking at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention).
49 On the distinction between original intent and original understanding and the legal pri-
macy of the latter, see RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 8-9, 17-18. On ratification as the primary
source of original understanding, see id. at note 17.
50 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note I, at 540 (Thomas McKean at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention):
Again, because it is unnecessary; for the powers of Congress, being derived from the people in
the mode pointed out by this Constitution, and being therein enumerated and positively granted,
can be no other than what this positive grant conveys .... With respect to executive officers,
(Vol. 3:469
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rejoined that the denied powers were slender, and that the Constitution would
leave the states with little to do. 5 ' The federalists countered, in turn, that the
states would enjoy control over their "internal police."52 One example of this
they have no manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is by positive grant and commission
delegated to them.
Id. See also 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 148-49 (James Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying
convention). Cf the comments of Tench Coxe:
The Federal government and the state governments are neither coordinate, co-equal, nor even
similar .... They are of different natures. The general government is federal, or a union of
sovereignties, for special purposes: The state governments are social, or an association of indi-
viduals, for all the purposes of society and government.
Quoted in COOKE, supra note 1, at 118.
51 E.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 313 (Melancton Smith speaking at the New York ratify-
ing convention) ("I am, sir, at a loss to know how the state legislatures will spend their
time."). Cf 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 171 (Patrick Henry at the Virginia ratifying
convention):
You [state legislators] are not to have the right to legislate in any but trivial cases; you are not to
touch private contracts; you are not to have the right of having arms in your own defence; you
cannot be trusted with dealing out justice between man and man. What shall the states have to
do? Take care of the poor, repair and make highways, erect bridges, and so on, and so on?
Abolish the state legislatures at once. What purposes should they be continued for? Our legisla-
ture will indeed be a ludicrous spectacle - one hundred and eighty men marching in solemn,
farcical procession, exhibiting a mournful proof of the lost liberty of their country, without the
power of restoring it. But, sir, we have the consolation that it is a mixed government; that is, it
may work sorely on your neck, but you will have some comfort by saying, that it was a federal
government in its origin.
Id.
52 See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, ch. 17, doc. 22, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/foun-
ders/documents/v I chI7s22.html (last accessed Apr. 8, 2003) ("to draw a line of demarkation
which would give to the General Government every power requisite for general purposes,
and leave to the States every power which might be most beneficially administered by
them"). See also Letter from the Hon. Roger Sherman & the Hon. Oliver Ellsworth, Esq. to
Governor Huntington (Sept. 26, 1787), in I ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 492.
Examples of such statements at the federal convention include: I Farrand, supra note
1, at 157 (James Wilson) (opining that "The state governments ought to be preserved - the
freedom of the people and their internal good police depends on their existence in full vigor
- but such a government can only answer local purposes .. "); id. at 165 ("Mr. Williamson
was agst. giving a power that might restrain the States from regulating their internal
police."); id. at 439 (Luther Martin) (stating that "A general government may operate on
individuals in cases of general concern, and still be federal. This distinction is with the
states, as states, represented by the people of those states. States will take care of their
internal police and local concerns. The general government has no interest, but the protec-
tion of the whole."). See Roger Sherman's remarks in 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 25,
observing:
that it would be difficult to draw the line between the powers of the Genil. Legislatures, and those
to be left with the States; that he did not like the definition contained in the Resolution, and
proposed in place of the words "of individual legislation" line 4 inclusive, to insert "to make
laws binding on the people of the <United> States in all cases <which may concern the common
interests of the Union>; but not to interfere with <the Government of the individual States in any
matters of internal police which respect the Govt. of such States only, and wherein the General>
welfare of the U. States is not concerned."
See also id. at 26 (reporting Edmund Randolph as saying, "This is a formidable idea indeed.
It involves the power of violating all the laws and constitutions of the States, and of inter-
meddling with their police."); id. at 198 (Rufus King) (stating "The most numerous objects
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argument was offered by the federalist-lexicographer Noah Webster, who wrote
that "the powers of the Congress are defined, to extend only to those matters
which are in their nature and effects, general . . . . [T]he Congress cannot
meddle with the internal police of any State, or abridge its Sovereignty.
5 3
James Madison penned what is probably the best known comment of this sort:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous
and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war,
peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will,
for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will
extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and pros-
perity of the State.
54
In the contemporary public understanding, a reservation to the states of
"internal" governance implied a partial enumeration of exclusive state powers.
This public understanding was the product of writings by popular pre-Revolu-
tionary authors, such as Richard Bland and John Dickinson, who had argued
that only the colonial governments, and not Parliament, had constitutional
power over "internal" colonial affairs. The examples of "internal" affairs cited
most frequently were taxation and judicial matters; but the colonies' exclusive
of legislation belong to the States. Those of the Nati. Legislature were but few. The chief of
them were commerce & revenue.").
Examples of such statements at the state ratifying conventions include: 2 ELLIOT, supra
note I, at 78 (Col. Joseph B. Varnum speaking at the Massachusetts ratifying convention);
id. at 241 (John Williams at the New York ratifying convention) (opining that "The constitu-
tion should be so formed as not to swallow up the state governments: the general govern-
ment ought to be confined to certain national objects; and the states should retain such
powers as concern their own internal police."); id. at 283 (John Jay speaking at the New
York ratifying convention); id. at 385 (Chancellor Robert Livingston speaking at the New
York ratifying convention ); 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 259 (James Madison speaking at the
Virginia ratifying convention); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 38 (James Iredell speaking at the
North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 160 (William Davie speaking at the North Caro-
lina ratifying convention).
See also Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler (Oct. 8, 1787), in 3 Farrand, supra
note I, at 103 ("The powers of the General Government are so defined as not to destroy the
Sovereignty of the Individual States."); 2 Jensen, supra note I, at 190 ("One of the People"
writing that internal matters are reserved to the states); Coxe, supra note 1, at 93 ("nor can
[Congress] do any other matter or thing appertaining to the internal affairs of any state,
whether legislative, executive or judicial, civil or ecclesiastical."). Other quotations are col-
lected in RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 66-76 (1987).
Anti-federalists sometimes adopted the same distinction. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra
note 1, at 332 (Melancton Smith speaking at the New York ratifying convention).
13 "America," in COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN & GARY L. McDOWELL, FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITU-
TION: WRITINGS OF THE "OTHER" FEDERALISTS: 1787-1788 176 (1998). See also HANSON,
supra note 1, at 252 (writing that states retain, "The whole internal government of their
respective republics"); I Farrand, supra note 1, at 492 (Oliver Ellsworth and Rufus King)
(distinguishing between state or local objects and federal or general objects).
5" THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93. Cf. 9 Jensen, supra note I, at 692 ("A Native of
Virginia") (stating that, "To [the state legislatures] is left the whole domestic government of
the states; they may still regulate the rules of property, the rights of persons, every thing that
relates to their internal police, and whatever effects [sic] neither foreign affairs nor the rights
of other States."). As we shall see, the "rules of property" and the "rights of persons" must
be seen as in addition to matters that do not affect other states. See infra Part V.
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right to tax was said to follow from their exclusive right to regulate colonial
property; and other legislative authority was claimed as well.55 Thus, by repre-
senting that the states would control their "internal police," federalists were
assuring the public that the states would, with the exceptions enumerated in the
Constitution, retain at least the powers that Americans had claimed for their
colonial governments.
Such reassurances were not, however, enough for the anti-federalists, who
wanted yet more specificity.56 They pointed out that the drafters themselves
had enumerated some powers denied to the central government; why not list
more? 57 In response, federalist essayists and orators - particularly those who
were lawyers - proceeded to enumerate particular powers and classes of pow-
ers to be exercised concurrently or exclusively by the states. Some shorter
enumerations came from such prominent founders as Alexander Hamilton;
James Madison; James Wilson; Edmund Pendleton, Chancellor of Virginia;
James Iredell, who had served North Carolina as a judge and attorney general
and who later was appointed to the United States Supreme Court; and John
Marshall, a delegate at the Virginia ratifying convention and later Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court. Several anonymous Federalist authors
also provided short enumerations.58
A number of longer, more complete enumerations of state-reserved pow-
ers have survived as well. Some were contained in anonymous, but important,
federalist tracts. 59 Another long list appeared in a popular article by Alexander
55 See TREVOR COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE: WHIG HISTORY AND THE INTELLEC-
TUAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 174-8 1 (Liberty Fund 1998) (1965) (discuss-
ing Bland's influence and ideas). See also THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON,
1764-1774 173-77 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1895) ("Resolutions
Adopted by the Assembly of Pennsylvania Relative to the Stamp Act," claiming for colonies
taxation power and trial by jury), 193-96 ("A Petition to the King from the Stamp Act Con-
gress," claiming for the colonies "full power of legislation" and trial by jury).
56 See, e.g., Letter from Edmund Randolph to the Speaker of the House of Delegates of
Virginia (Oct. 10, 1787), in I ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 482, 491; Letter from the Hon. Roger
Sherman & the Hon. Oliver Ellsworth, Esq. (Sept. 26, 1787), in I ELLIOT, supra note I, at
492, 493 (containing the reasons of the Hon. Elbridge Gerry, Esq. for not signing the federal
constitution); 2 ELLIOT, supra note I, at 81 (Rev. Samuel Niles at the Massachusetts ratify-
ing convention).
Sometimes a federalist admitted that the lines were rightly vague. See, e.g., id. at 84
(James Bowdoin at the Massachusetts ratifying convention).
" 2 Jensen, supra note 1, at 398, 427 (Robert Whitehill speaking at the Pennsylvania ratify-
ing convention). The primary enumeration of powers denied occurs in U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, and includes, but is not limited to, protection from suspensions of the writ of habeas
corpus and from bills of attainder.
Federalist Jasper Yeates, at the same convention, responded to Whitehill's argument by
stating that the enumerated items in Article I, § 9 were merely exceptions to enumerated
powers. 2 Jensen, supra note I, at 435. This counter-argument may have proved too much,
and does not seem to have been widely used.
58 E.g., 4 Jensen, supra note I, at 70 ("Harrington") (implying that states would have power
over "real estates").
19 5 Jensen, supra note I, at 599 ("A.B.," Jan. 2, 1788); 5 Jensen, supra note l, at 651-52
(Massachusetts GAZETI-E Jan. 8, 1788). Both clearly were intended to be relied on. The
former was in specific response to the claims of the anti-federalist essayist "Brutus" that the
Constitution imposed insufficient limits on the federal government. Id. at 596, 599. The
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Contee Hanson, a Congressman from Maryland.6 ° Still another was located in
a letter to a New Hampshire ratifying convention delegate, written by Nathaniel
Peaslee Sargeant, a Justice (and shortly thereafter, Chief Justice) of the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court.61 Yet another is part of an essay by Alexan-
der White, a distinguished Virginia lawyer who served in the House of
Burgesses before the Revolution, in the House of Delegates after the election,
and in the Virginia ratifying convention in 1788.62 Perhaps the most signifi-
cant enumeration of state powers appeared in the essays of Tench Coxe.63 His
were significant because of his extraordinary influence on the public debate.
Coxe was a friend of Hamilton, a Philadelphia businessman, a member of Con-
gress, and later Hamilton's assistant secretary of the treasury. His writings
were so prolific and so widely circulated that he, more even than Hamilton or
Madison, may have been most responsible for creating a public understanding
of the Constitution.64 As was true of other enumerations, moreover, Coxe's list
was never convincingly rebutted. He drew a response from an anti-federalist
author called "A Farmer," but merely to question the importance of the items
on the list, not the list itself.
65
It is notable that the various enumerations of state powers were remarka-
bly consistent. Some items were on some lists and not on others, of course, but
latter was reprinted in two other papers. In one, the Massachusetts Centinel, it was pub-
lished under the headline, "READ THIS! READ THIS!" 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 652.
60 HANSON, supra note 1. On March 27, 1788, Hanson wrote to Tench Coxe of the "avidity,
with which I am informed my humble essay has been bought up." 8 Jensen, supra note 1, at
520-21.
61 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 563, 568.
62 The relevant (first) portion of White's essay (with explanatory annotations) is found at 8
Jensen, supra note 1, at 401-08.
63 Coxe, supra note 1 (contains the first two "Freeman" essays). They also are found in 15
Jensen, supra note 1, at 454, 508. A third "Freeman" essay appears in 16 id. at 49.
Coxe also wrote "An American Citizen." See Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 133-
54.
' COOKE, supra note 1, at I11.
65 The Fallacies of the Freeman Detected by a Farmer, ch. 8, doc. 35 (Apr. 23, 1788),
available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlch8s35.html (last
accessed Mar. 7, 2003). The Farmer argued that the retained powers were merely ministerial
in character and federal powers, including the taxing power, could render them nugatory:
That the state governments have certain ministerial and convenient powers continued to them is
not denied, and in the exercise of which they may support, but cannot controul the general
government, nor protect their own citizens from the exertions of civil or military tyranny, and
this ministerial power will continue with the states as long as two-thirds of Congress shall think
their agency necessary; but even this will be no longer than two-thirds of Congress shall think
proper to propose, and use the influence of which they would be so largely possessed to remove
it.
But these powers, of which the Freeman [i.e., Coxe] gives us such a profuse detail, and in
describing which he repeats the same powers with only varying the terms, such as the powers of
officering and training the militia, appointing state officers, and governing in a number of inter-
nal cases, do not any of them separately, nor all taken together, amount to independent sover-
eignty; they are powers of mere ministerial agency ....
... The state governments may contract for making roads (except post-roads) erecting bridges,
cutting canals, or any other object of public importance; but when the contract is performed or
the work done, may not Congress constitutionally prevent the payment?
ENUMERATED POWERS OF STATES
there was a great deal of overlap and relatively little dispute among federalist
writers about which powers were reserved to the states.
The following are the reserved powers of states, as federalist speakers and
writers enumerated them:
A. Training the Militia and Appointing Its Officers
Federalist writers emphasized continued state control over the militia, one
of the few retained state powers actually specified in the Constitution.66 State
governance of the militia had been supported strongly at the national conven-
tion by Elbridge Gerry, who declared that it was "a matter on which the exis-
tence of a State might depend."6 7 Its importance to the states was to lie in the
militia's role as a counterweight to national military forces and protection of
state power against federal overreaching.
68
B. Local Government
The federalists represented that incorporation of local government was a
state, not a federal, power.69 So also was regulation of local government 7° and
selection of its officers.7'
C. Regulation of Real Property
Federalists depicted the Constitution as leaving regulation of real property
outside the national authority. They repeatedly represented that the states were
66 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. See also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 537 (Thomas McKean
discussing this clause at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at
419 (John Marshall discussing this clause at the Virginia ratifying convention); 2 Jensen,
supra note 1, at 222 ("Plain Truth: Reply to an Officer of the Late Continental Army,"
Independent Gazetteer (Nov. 10, 1787)); 9 Jensen, supra note 1, at 655, 673 ("A Native of
Virginia") ("the appointment of militia officers, and training of the militia, are reserved to
the respective States"); Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 152 (Tench Coxe).
67 1 Farrand, supra note 1, at 165.
68 THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (James Madison). See also Coxe, supra note 1, at 92-93.
Cf 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 52 (Patrick Henry speaking at the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion). For a general discussion of federalism values in state control of the militia and the
right of citizens to bear arms, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 50-56 (1998).
69 E.g., 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 652 (Massachusetts GAZErTE, Jan. 8, 1788) (citing incor-
poration of "political societies, towns and boroughs").
70 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 568 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant).
71 Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 152.
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to enjoy exclusive power over land titles,7" land transfers, 73 descents, 74 and
other aspects of real estate.7 5
D. Regulation of Personal Property Outside of Commerce
The text of the Constitution acknowledges the right of states to adopt and
enforce laws pertaining to the inspection of goods.7 6 In addition, federalists
assured their audience that regulation of personalty outside interstate commerce
was to be exclusively a state responsibility. 77 Specifically, they listed as state
preserves: control of testamentary succession 78 and of intestate distribution of
personalty;79 firearms for hunting and self-defense; hunting, fowling, and fish-
ing; and titles to goods.80 Moreover, state jurisdiction was very nearly exclu-
sive over a uniquely important and unfortunate kind of movables: slaves.8' Of
72 Coxe, supra note I, at 94 (entails); 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 599 ("A.B.," Hampshire
GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 1788) (citing title to lands); 8 Jensen, supra note 1, at 404 (Alexander
White) (citing "titles of lands").
73 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 40 (Edmund Pendleton); id. at 553 (John Marshall); THE
FEDERALIST No. 29, at 183 (Hamilton). Cf Maryland Resolutions, 2 ELLIOT, supra note I,
at 55 1.
74 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 620 (Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention); THE FED-
ERALIST No. 29, at 183 (Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Hamilton); Maryland
Resolutions, 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 551; id. at 40 (Edmund Pendleton at the Virginia
ratifying convention); Coxe, supra note 1, at 94; 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 568 (Nathaniel
Peaslee Sargeant); 8 Jensen, supra note 1, at 404 (Alexander White).
75 5 Jensen, supra note I, at 652 (Massachusetts GAZETTE) (opining that land officers and
surveyors would be within the state sphere); 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 568 (Nathaniel Peas-
lee Sargeant) (partition); 4 Jensen, supra note 1, at 79 ("Harrington") (implying that federal
government would not control "real estates"); 16 Jensen, supra note 1, at 51 (Tench Coxe,
claiming that the states retain "[t]he lordship of the soil," which "remains in full perfection in
every state") (emphasis in original). See also I THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKIN-
SON 1764-1774 xvi (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1895), wherein Dickin-
son is noted to have approvingly quoted Lord Chatham (William Pitt the Elder), who in 1774
spoke on behalf of the colonies:
"As an Englishman, I recognize to the Americans, their supreme unalterable right of property.
As an American, I would equally recognize to England, her supreme right of regulating com-
merce and navigation. The distinction is involved in the abstract nature of things; property is
private, individual, absolute; the touch of another annihilates it. Trade is an extended and com-
plicated consideration; it reaches as far as ships can sail, or winds can blow; it is a vast and
various machine. To regulate the numberless movements of its several parts, and combine them
into one harmonious effect, for the good of the whole, requires the superintending wisdom and
energy of the supreme power of the empire."
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cI. 2; see also 16 Jensen, supra note 1, at 50 (Tench Coxe).
77 Hanson, supra note I, at 252; 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 355 (Hamilton speaking at the
New York ratifying convention); id. at 384 (Chancellor Robert Livingston at the New York
ratifying convention) (opining that states would retain "the power over property"); 3 ELLIOT,
supra note 1, at 553 (John Marshall at the Virginia ratifying convention) (speaking of state
control over "the mode of transferring property"); 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 599 ("A.B.")
(citing "lands and other property").
78 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 652 (Massachusetts GAZETTE) (citing probate, administration of
estates); 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 568 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant) (citing wills and
administrators).
79 8 Jensen, supra note I, at 404 (Alexander White).
80 Id.
81 3 ELLIOT, supra note I, at 453, 621-22 (James Madison speaking at the Virginia ratifying
convention); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 102 (James Iredell speaking at the North Carolina
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course, an express exception to exclusive state jurisdiction over property was
the power of Congress to adopt patent and copyright laws.82
E. Control Over Domestic and Family Affairs
State control over slavery and decedents' estates were but two aspects of
exclusive state authority over domestic affairs. The federalists represented
sumptuary laws83 and the regulation of marriage and divorce 8 4 as among the
states' exclusive reserved powers. An anonymous advocate of the Constitution
affirmed that the states would assure to men "possession of their houses, wives,
children . . 8S States were to supervise guardianship and issues of legiti-
macy.86 Alexander Hamilton referenced generally the retained nature of state
control over domestic life.
8 7
F. Criminal Law
On numerous occasions, federalists cited criminal law and local law
enforcement, 8 8 as well as the administration of civil justice and state legal sys-
tems generally, 89 as exemplars of reserved state powers. With the exceptions
ratifying convention); id. at 286 (Gen. C.C. Pinkney, speaking in the South Carolina legisla-
ture, considering calling a ratifying convention); 2 ELLIOT, supra note I, at 114-15 (William
Heath speaking at the Massachusetts ratifying convention) (assuming it was a state preroga-
tive as to whether to end slavery).
At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson and Thomas McKean both
suggested that Congress might, after 1808, have the power to outlaw slavery. 2 ELLIOT,
supra note I, at 484 (Wilson); 2 Jensen, supra note I, at 417 (McKean). However, Wilson
may have been speaking ironically. He and others, in response to complaints from abolition-
ists that the Constitution did not abolish slavery or give Congress power to do so, stated that
the power to prohibit importation would merely lay a foundation for eventual abolition. 2
ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 452. Similarly, at the Massachusetts ratifying convention, Thomas
Dawes argued that "But we may say, that, although slavery is not smitten by an apoplexy,
yet it has received a mortal wound, and will die of a consumption." Id. at 41.
82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 2 Jensen, supra note 1, at 415 (Thomas McKean speaking at
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
83 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 394 (rejecting George Mason's proposal to give Congress this
power). Cf id. at 607 (Mason) (impliedly admits that, without authorization, Congress does
not have this power).
4 Coxe, supra note i, at 95 (referencing state power to "regulate descents and marriages");
5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 652 (Massachusetts GAZETrE) (averring that licensing marriage is
exclusively a state concern); 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 568 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant)
(referencing marriage and divorce as state concerns).
85 5 Jensen, supra note i, at 599 ("A.B.").
86 Id. at 568 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant).
87 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 267-68 (Hamilton at the New York ratifying convention)
(speaking on domestic life generally).
88 Coxe, supra note 1, at 95-96; 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 652 (Massachusetts GAZETrE)
(referencing county lieutenants, sheriffs, coroners, constables).
89 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 267-68 (Hamilton at the New York ratifying convention)
(speaking on federal inability to "new model" state civil and criminal institutions or the
private conduct of individuals); Id. at 350, 355 (Hamilton at the New York ratifying conven-
tion); id. at 384 (Chancellor Robert Livingston at the New York ratifying convention) (opin-
ing that states would retain "the power over life and death"); 3 ELLIOT, supra note I, at 620
(Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention) (speaking of the states' right to preserve their
legal systems); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 142 (Gov. Samuel Johnston at the North Carolina
Spring 2003]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
specified in the Constitution, inala in se criminal law was to be exclusively a
state concern. 90 Speaking at the North Carolina ratifying convention, James
Iredell represented that Congress could punish treason and that "[lt]hey have
power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas,
and offences against the law of nations," but that "[t]hey have no power to
define any other crime whatever."'"
Despite the sweeping nature of this statement, other federalists acknowl-
edged that Congress, as part of its commercial power, would enjoy concurrent
jurisdiction with the states over mala prohibita.92
G. Civil Justice
The federalists represented that the administration of civil justice (e.g.,
contract, tort, and property disputes) was reserved exclusively to the states
unless the issue was one of federal law or the dispute involved citizens of dif-
ferent states.93 For example, they affirmed that the torts of libel,94 defamation
ratifying convention on the same topic); I Farrand, supra note 1, at 133 (Roger Sherman at
the federal convention); id. at 134, 318-19 (Madison at the federal convention) (stating that
the security of private rights, the administration of justice should be state powers); 4 ELLIOT,
supra note 1, at 162 (William MacLeane at the North Carolina ratifying convention) (telling
the delegates that "the judicial power of the states is not impaired"); 2 Jensen, supra note 1,
at 190 ("One of the People" writes that trials by jury are outside the federal sphere); 5
Jensen, supra note I, at 652 (Massachusetts GAZETTE) (justices of the peace); id. at 599
(citing murder, adultry, theft, robbery, burglary, lying, perjury as all matters for state action);
id. at 568 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant) (citing state courts).
90 Coxe, supra note 1, at 95-96; Hanson, supra note 1, at 252; 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 652
(Massachusetts GAZETTE). See also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 355 (Hamilton speaking at
the New York ratifying convention).
91 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 219. See also 5 Jensen, supra note i, at 568 (Nathaniel
Peaslee Sargeant) (averring that, "ye Laws respecting criminal offenders in all cases, except
Treason, are subjects for [state] Legislation"); Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 359 (James
Iredell, in his written response to George Mason).
92 Coxe, supra note 1, at 95. This may be the origin of the criminal jurisdiction of Congress
to which Madison referred in the Virginia ratifying convention. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at
464-65.
93 THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 118 (Hamilton); Coxe, supra note 1, at 95 (property, contract,
and nuisance law).
See also the comments of William MacLaine at the North Carolina ratifying
convention:
There are many instances in which no court but the state courts can have any jurisdiction whatso-
ever, except where parties claim land under the grant of different states, or the subject of dispute
arises under the Constitution itself. The state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over every other
possible controversy that can arise between the inhabitants of their own states; nor can the fed-
eral courts intermeddle with such disputes, either originally or by appeal.
4 ELLIOT, supra note l, at 163. See also supra note 70.
At one point, James Wilson speaks of federal jurisdiction over contracts, but, from the
context, he appears to be speaking of diversity jurisdiction. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 492
(James Wilson speaking at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention). See also 3 ELLIOT, supra
note 1, at 553 (John Marshall speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention).
94 James Wilson distinguished the tort of libel from other "freedom of the press" issues;
freedom of the press, as he understood it, was merely freedom from prior restraint. 2
ELLIOT, supra note I, at 449 (James Wilson speaking at the Pennsylvania ratifying conven-
tion). While maintaining that Congress had no power to impose a prior restraint on the
press, Wilson and other federalists also represented that it had no authority over the law of
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generally,9 5 and nuisance 96 remained entirely state concerns. Outside of Con-
gress' bankruptcy power,97 only the state courts would have cognizance of con-
tracts made 98 or debts owed 99 between citizens of the same state. By
extension, Congress could not interfere with state paper money already
issued' ° ° or with a state's public securities.' 0'
H. Religion and Education
At the time of the ratification debate, religion and education often were
thought of as inseparable.'0 2 Although massive federal case law arose after
adoption of the First Amendment, 10 3 at the time of ratification federalists repre-
sented that the governance of religion, the establishment of religious institu-
tions, and the incorporation of religious entities were all exclusively state
concerns." ° With one exception, the same was to be true for education: the
national convention rejected a proposal to add a national university to Con-
gress' enumerated powers, after being told that this could be accomplished
through administration of the federal capital district. But, in context, the impli-
cation was that the federal government could not establish a university other-
wise or anywhere else.'0 5 Similarly, the convention rejected resolutions
offered to add Congressional authority "[t]o establish seminaries for the promo-
tion of literature and the arts and sciences" and "[t]o establish public institu-
tions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce,
trades, and manufactures."' 0°6 Thus, federalist authors seem to have been on
libel. See, e.g., id. at 468 (James Wilson speaking at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention);
2 Jensen, supra note 1, at 219 ("Plain Truth").
95 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 599 ("A.B.").
96 Id. at 652 (Massachusetts GAZETTE).
9' U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
98 8 Jensen, supra note 1, at 404 (Alexander White); 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 553 (John
Marshall speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention).
99 4 ELLIOT, supra note I, at 181 (William MacLaine speaking at the North Carolina ratify-
ing convention).
'00 id. at 181-83 (William Davie speaking at the North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at
184 (Stephen Cabarrus speaking at the same convention).
'0' Id. at 191 (William Davie speaking at the North Carolina ratifying convention).
102 Thus, in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Congress had stated that "Religion, morality,
and knowledge . . .being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." See Act of Aug. 7, 1789,
ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50.
103 For a survey, see CHEMERINKSY, supra note 1, at 967-1037.
104 Coxe, supra note 1, at 92-93; 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 194 (James Iredell speaking at
the North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 198 (Gov. Samuel Johnson at the North
Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 208 (Richard D. Spaight speaking at the North Carolina
ratifying convention); id. at 300 (Gen. C.C. Pinkney, speaking in the South Carolina legisla-
ture, considering calling a ratifying convention); 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 652 (Massachu-
setts GAZETTE); 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 568 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant); 8 Jensen, supra
note 1, at 404 (Alexander White).
105 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 616. See also Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note I (Tench Coxe,
stating that the federal government could not interfere with the selection of "Presidents and
other officers of Universities, Colleges and Academies").
1o Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 322; Coxe, supra note 1, at 92-93, 95 (can be read as
meaning that states and federal government have concurrent rights to establish public institu-
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firm ground when they assured the public that the national government had no
power to create "charity schools"'
' 7 - or any other schools.' 0 8
L Social Services
In the founding era, social services generally were the responsibility of
churches, families, and local communities. According to the federalists, this
would continue. Alexander Contee Hanson,' 0 9 Tench Coxe,I 0 and other fed-
eralists'' ruled this area of life out of the national sphere.
J. Control of Agriculture
The great source of authority for national economic regulation was to be,
of course, the Commerce Clause." 2 That clause was relatively non-controver-
sial;'" 3 however, federalist writers clearly represented it as a good deal nar-
rower than courts have since construed it. For example, the United States
Supreme Court has relied on the Commerce Clause to justify federal regulation
of agriculture.' '" Insofar as original understanding is a guide, this is almost
certainly an error." 5
Thus, Alexander Hamilton, the arch nationalist who once expressed a
desire to regulate agriculture at the national level,' 16 purportedly'"' had
changed his mind by the time of the ratification debates. In Federalist No. 17,
he famously wrote that "the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of
tions, but this is uncertain, because some of the institutions on Coxe's list - the religious
ones - he also says may be chartered only by states).
107 5 Jensen, supra note I, at 652 (Massachusetts GAZETrE).
108 Id. at 568 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant).
'09 Hanson, supra note i, at 252 (citing "protection of the weak").
110 Coxe, supra note I, at 96. Coxe adds, "In short, besides the particulars enumerated,
every thing of a domestic nature must or can be done by them [i.e., the states]."
111 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 652 (Massachusetts GAZETTE) (saying that overseeing the poor
and poor houses are state concerns); id. at 568 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant) (referencing as
state concerns, "looking after Poor persons, punishing Idlers, vagabonds & c.").
112 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
113 4 Jensen, supra note 1, at 318-19 (William Cranch) (noting in a letter to John Quincy
Adams that "It is allow'd by every body that [Congress] ought to have power 'To Regulate
Commerce.'"); 8 Jensen, supra note 1, at 70, 72 ("Cato Uticensis" - an anti-federalist) ("[I]t
was, I believe, the general opinion, that new powers should be vested in Congress, to enable
it, in the amplest manner, to regulate the commerce.").
''4 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. II (1942).
115 The error is not mitigated by the interrelationship of agriculture and commerce; see infra
Part V.
116 1 Farrand, supra note I, at 287, 329.
117 "Purportedly" because Hamilton's goal was, apparently, to deceive the public into
believing the federal government would be one of strictly limited powers, but then after
ratification, to "triumph altogether over the state governments and reduce them to an entire
subordination, dividing the large states into smaller districts." 13 Jensen, supra note 1, at
278 (private, unpublished paper by Hamilton, Sept. 1787). Subsequently, Hamilton sought
to bring his fraud to fruition with his "Report of Manufactures" of 1791, which claimed that
agriculture and manufactures were matters of national concern. See Alexander Hamilton,
Report on Manufactures, in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/al 8
I s2 I.html (last accessed Apr. 8, 2003). Of course, Hamilton's private thoughts, in contradic-
tion to his public representations, are not probative of the understanding of the ratifiers.
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a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for
by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction."' 18
Perhaps George Mason, an advocate of keeping control of farming at the state
level,' 19 had influenced him. In any event, even Melancton Smith, Hamilton's
great antagonist at the New York ratifying convention, conceded that he also
understood control over agriculture to be a reserved power, although he was not
sure that the states should exercise it.120 In Massachusetts, Justice Sargeant let
it be known that only the states would have power to regulate "common fields"
and "fisheries."' 
2'
All of these inferences were strengthened by the fact that the constitutional
convention had rejected the idea of a Secretary of Domestic Affairs, who was
to have authority to regulate agriculture.
122
K. Control of Other Business Enterprise
Federalist writers and speakers represented that, outside the immediate
stream of commerce, regulation of non-agricultural business was to be exclu-
sively a state prerogative. This appears to be the meaning of Hamilton's refer-
ence to "agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature.' 2 3 Indeed, the
national convention had rejected a resolution that would have empowered the
federal government directly to regulate manufacturing' 24 and also defeated a
motion to authorize the federal government to cut canals and issue corporate
118 THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 18 (Hamilton). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 209
(Hamilton).
119 1 Farrand, supra note 1, at 160 (quoted in Hamilton's notes).
120 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 313 (Melancton Smith) ("I am, sir, at a loss to know how the
state legislatures will spend their time. Will they make laws to regulate agriculture? I imag-
ine this will be best regulated by the sagacity and industry of those who practise it.").
121 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 568 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant).
122 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 342-43.
123 THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 118 (emphasis added). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at
209 (Hamilton).
What are the chief sources of expense in every government?... The answers plainly is, wars and
rebellions ... The expenses arising from those institutions which are relative to the mere domes-
tic police of a state, to the support of its legislative, executive, and judicial departments, with
their different appendages, and to the encouragement of agriculture and manufactures (which
will comprehend almost all the objects of state expenditure), are insignificant in comparison with
those which relate to the national defense.
Id.
At the New York ratifying convention, 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 265-66, Hamilton
suggested that federal legislation should include manufacturing, but the context makes the
passage deceiving. In fact, he was rebutting complaints about the small size of the proposed
federal Congress by stating that its members need know only about those issues in a general,
not a detailed, way. Id. at 256; cf id. at 283 (John Jay). See also id. at 442-43 (James
Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
124 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 342-43. Madison later wrote in a private letter that Congress
retained the right to promote manufacturing through tariff protection, but that was in 1832,
more than forty years later:
It deserves particular attention, that the Congress which first met contained sixteen members,
eight of them in the House of Representatives, - fresh from the Convention which framed the
Constitution, and a considerable number who had been members of the State Conventions which
had adopted it, taken as well from the party which opposed as from those who had espoused its
adoption. Yet it appears from the debates in the House of Representatives, (those in the Senate
Spring 20031
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
charters, apparently for transportation companies. 125 During the ratification
debate, federalists itemized several other businesses that would be regulated
only by the states. The federal government would have no power over the
press, according to Hamilton' 2 6 and numerous other federalists. 127 Alexander
Contee Hanson identified "promotion of useful arts" - i.e., technology - as
exclusively a state concern. 128 Justice Nathaniel Sargeant cited fisheries.
12 9
Of course, the Constitution itself affirms the authority of states to inspect
goods, ' 30 and Tench Coxe concluded that this was an exclusive state power. 131
Coxe also placed regulation of "unlicensed public houses, nuisances, and many
other things of like nature" in the state sphere.' 3 2 All or most business licens-
ing was an exclusive state concern as well. 133 Some writers denied that the
central government would have any power to construct or maintain local infra-
structure, such as roads, ferries, and bridges, unless it was "post road" infra-
structure. 134 The post office, with its appurtenant roads, apparently comprised
the only socialized business the federal government was to operate.
135
not having been taken,) that not a doubt was started of the power of Congress to impose duties
on imports for the encouragement of domestic manufactures ....
I ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 518.
'25 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 616. Note, however, that James Wilson seems to have
thought that the federal government would be able to make "internal improvements." See 2
ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 526 (James Wilson speaking at the Pennsylvania ratifying conven-
tion). His conception of the federal power may have been broader than most, if that is the
proper interpretation of some other remarks at the Pennsylvania convention: "The power
and business of the state legislatures relate to the great objects of life, liberty and property;
the same are also objects of the general government." Id. at 464.
126 See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513-14 (Hamilton) ("Why, for instance, should it be said
that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restric-
tions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating
power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense
for claiming that power.").
127 E.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 463 (James Wilson speaking at the Pennsylvania ratify-
ing convention); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 208-09 (Richard D. Spaight speaking at the
North Carolina ratifying convention); 2 Jensen, supra note 1, at 190 ("One of the People"),
192 ("AVENGING JUSTICE"); id. at 219 ("Plain Truth"); 4 Jensen, supra note 1, at 182
("Popicola") (stating that press is a reserved power); id. at 331 ("One of the Middling Inter-
est") (same); id. at 334 ("Valerius") (same); 9 Jensen, supra note 1, at 691 ("A Native of
Virginia) (same); Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 48 (Noah Webster).
128 Hanson, supra note I, at 252. The exception, of course, is federal copyright and patent
protection.
129 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 568 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant).
130 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. See also 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 607.
131 Coxe, supra note l, at 92.
132 Id. at 95.
13' 2 ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 468 (James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention)
(speaking on licensing of press); 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 652 (Massachusetts GAZETrE)
(licensing of public houses).
134 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 652 (Massachusetts GAZETTE); 5 Jensen, supra note 1, at 568
(Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant) (highways, bridges). Coxe, supra note 1, is unclear on whether
infrastructure is a concurrent or exclusive state power.
135 U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 7.
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IV. VALUE OF THE ENUMERATION OF EXCLUSIVE RESERVED STATE POWERS
Although the federalists' enumeration of state reserved powers (with few
exceptions) never was written explicitly into the Constitution, that enumeration
should inform our understanding of the Constitution. Just as lawyers and
judges marshal listed examples to help define the scope of general classes
under the principle of ejusdem generis,' 36 the federalists' enumeration assists
us in identifying the dividing line between federal authority and exclusive state
authority. The federalists' enumeration does this not because it reveals the
framers' intent, "but rather because their writings, like those of other intelligent
and informed people of the time, display how the text of the Constitution was
originally understood."' 37 More broadly, the enumeration assists us in identi-
fying the principles underlying American federalism.
The next Part furnishes an example of the latter: the enumeration estab-
lishes that the Constitution was not finally understood to institutionalize an
exclusively internality/externality division between state and federal powers.
Rather, the enumeration shows that the founding generation ultimately decided
to leave certain prerogatives with the states alone, even though they understood
that the exercise of those prerogatives would have implications beyond state
boundaries - and even though they understood that state action might impinge
on the federal government's exercise of its own authority.
V. LIMITS OF THE INTERNALITY/EXTERNALITY DICHOTOMY AS A CRITERION
FOR DIVISION OF POWERS
Scholars writing on federalism often have referred to it as system in which
powers are, or should be, divided according to whether the results of their exer-
cise are felt across jurisdictional lines. The idea is that decisions with only
local impacts should be made at the local level, while all or most decisions with
externalities - spill-over effects - ought to be made at a higher level.' 38 Pro-
fessor Henry N. Butler and Professor Jonathan R. Macey have called this the
"matching principle."' 39 Although this argument sometimes is advanced by
those who consider themselves federalism's friends, its practical result can be
to strengthen advocates of centralization because a determined seeker can find
136 "Of the same class." For application of the maxim in private law, see ROBERT G.
NATELSON, MODERN LAW OF DEEDS TO REAL PROPERTY 182-84 (1992). For treatment in
the public law context by an even more distinguished author, see Antonin Scalia, Common-
Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Inter-
preting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 26-27 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1977) (hereinafter Scalia).
137 Scalia, supra note 136, at 38. See also RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 8-9, 17-18.
138 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U.
CI. L. REV. 1484, 1495 (1987) ("Externalities present the principal countervailing consider-
ation in favor of centralized government .... ").
"I Butler & Macey, supra note 1, at 25 (under the matching principle, "in general, the size
of the geographic area affected by a specific pollution source should determine the appropri-
ate governmental level for responding to the pollution"). Later in the article, however, the
authors suggest that in the presence of externalities, interstate bargaining may be a better
solution than federal regulatory authority. Id. at 36-40.
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some spill-over effect in almost any activity.' 41 The finding in Wickard v.
Filburn,14 1 that a farmer who consumes his own crops thereby "affects" com-
merce by not selling his goods to someone else, is, after all, factually accurate,
and many writers, at least since the New Deal, have cited increasing interde-
pendence as a justification for expanding federal authority relative to that of the
states. 142
Whatever the objective merits of a pure internality/externality division of
powers, that is not the decision the founding generation made. To be sure, the
historical record contains plenty of quotations noting that internal matters were
reserved to the states.' 43 Spill-over effects sometimes were cited to justify the
grant of some powers to the federal government."44 Especially after the early
days of the Constitutional Convention, however, federalists were quick to deny
that the federal government was to regulate all matters with interstate
implications. "
To see that this was the case, one must first understand that the fact of
economic and interstate interdependence is not a recent development. Close
connection between commerce, agriculture, manufacturing, taxation, even the
arts, were realities in 1787. More importantly, this interrelationship was an
oft-repeated axiom in the constitutional debates. Hamilton, writing as Publius,
made the point:
The often-agitated question between agriculture and commerce has, from indubitable
experience, received a decision which has silenced the rivalship [sic] that once sub-
sisted between them, and has proved, to the satisfaction of their friends, that their
interests are intimately blended and interwoven. It has been found in various coun-
tries that, in proportion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. And
how could it have happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer vent for the
products of the earth, which furnishes new incitements to the cultivation of land,
which is the most powerful instrument in increasing the quantity of money in a state
1o One is reminded of Edward Lorenz's "butterfly effect" in meteorology. See, e.g., Bob
Ryan, A Look At Predicting the Weather; I Read Snowflakes, Not Tea Leaves, WASHINGTON
POST, Nov. 21, 1999, at B-03, col. I ("Does the flap of a butterfly's wings in Brazil set off a
tornado in Texas?").
14 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
142 See, e.g., Jefferson B. Fordham, The States in the Federal System - Vital Role or
Limbo?, 49 VA. L. REV. 666, 668 (1963) ("Ours is now an interdependent national economy.
Effective regulation must be country-wide in extent."). See also Karl A. Crowley, States'
Rights and Responsibilities and the Federal Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 76, 87 (1935)
(expressing similar sentiments in address to state bar association).
143 See, e.g., Butler & Macey, supra note 1, at 26 (quoting James Wilson). See also supra
notes 51-54. Bankruptcy was an exception to the rule that the states controlled internal
matters. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4.
Some other clauses that seem to govern only intra-state questions actually were viewed
as preventing externalities. One of these is the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
See Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and the
Constitution's Guaranty Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807, 825 (2002) (noting that some foun-
ders feared that if some states were monarchies, they would unsettle republican forms in
other states).
' E.g., 2 Jensen, supra note 1, at 415 (Thomas McKean at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention) (speaking on the federal copyright power).
145 An apparent exception is the speech of Jasper Yeates at the Pennsylvania ratifying con-
vention. 2 Jensen, supra note 1, at 435 ("The objects of state legislation are different from
those of the Federal Constitution. They are confined to matters within ourselves [sic].").
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- could that, in fine, which is the faithful handmaid of labor and industry, in every
shape, fail to augment that article, which is the prolific parent of far the greatest part
of the objects upon which they are exerted?
146
Other federalists said much the same thing: Charles Pinkney discussed the
interdependence of commerce, agriculture, and the professions at the national
convention in Philadelphia. 147 Thomas Dawes and James Bowdoin, both dele-
gates at the Massachusetts ratifying convention, provided detailed expositions
of the interconnections between commerce, agriculture, taxation, manufactures,
and other matters.14 8 James Wilson offered similar observations at the Penn-
sylvania ratifying convention, 149 as did William Davie at the North Carolina
convention'5 0 and, to a lesser extent, James Madison at the Virginia conven-
tion.' Tench Coxe152 and many other federalists,' 5 3 made closely-related
comments. Anti-federalists agreed. '14
There was also discussion of non-economic externalities, notably the
influence of religion. 155 Several participants, for example, raised the perceived
negative impact of the absence of federal power to enforce Christian religious
standards. At the Massachusetts ratifying convention, for example, some dele-
146 THE FEDERALIST No. 12, at 91 (Hamilton).
147 1 Farrand, supra note 1, at 397-404.
148 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 57-59. Bowdoin's remarks on the interrelationship of eco-
nomic factors appear in at least two places. Id. at 83, 85. Both are much too long and
intricate to reproduce here.
149 Id. at 492 (discussing the interaction of manufactures, commerce, contracts, credit, navi-
gation, and internal state laws).
15o 4 ELLIOT, supra note I, at 18-20, 149 (discussing interdependence of agriculture and
commerce).
151 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 345 (discussing the interdependence of agriculture and the
carrying trade).
152 COOKE, supra note 1, at 120; 9 Jensen, supra note 1, at 833, 839 (Coxe, writing as "An
American"). See also 2 Jensen, supra note 1, at 186, 187 ("One of the People" writing, "The
people of Pennsylvania, in general, are composed of men of three occupations, the farmer,
the merchant, the mechanic; the interests of these three are intimately blended together.").
The same author argued that the power over commerce should be in Congress, in part so the
states could "effectually encourage their manufactories." Id. at 187-88.
53 Examples include: 4 Jensen, supra note 1, at 25 ("A True American"); id. at 65-66
("A"); id. at 80-81 (Boston GAZETTE); id. at 85 ("One of the People"); id. at 234-35 ("Truth"
- a response to a writer also using that pseudonym); id. at 298-99 ("Atticus"); id. at 322-23
(Massachusetts GAZETTE, "Agrippa"); id. at 385-389 ("One of the Middle-Interest"); 5 Jen-
sen, supra note 1, at 531-34 ("Atticus"); id. at 563-69 (Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant); id. at
631-32 (Resolution of the Tradesmen of the Town of Boston); id. at 665-66 ("A Farmer"); 8
Jensen, supra note 1, at 345, 349 ("The State Soldier") (asserting, "Commerce then, freed
from the oppressive hand of state jealousy and local interest, traversing the whole continent
and seeking your commodities, would stamp a higher value on all your property."); id.
("State Soldier") (referencing "that extensive commerce which alone can ensure a lasting
value to our property"); 10 Jensen, supra note 1, at 1640-41 ("A Delegate Who Has Catched
Cold"); id. at 1736, 1737 (Speech by John O'Connor).
154 E.g., 4 Jensen, supra note 1, at 233 ("Truth"); 5 Jensen, supra note I, at 483-86, 540-42
("Agrippa"); id. at 493-500 ("Candidus").
155 Besides the material in the accompanying text, see, e.g., 5 Jensen, supra note I, at 600-
02 ("An Association of Christian Ministers to the Public") (expounding the temporal advan-
tages of piety, religion, and morality); id. at 631-32 (Resolutions of the Tradesman of the
Town of Boston) (claiming improved trade resulting from adoption of the Constitution
would promote industry and morality).
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gates pleaded for a federal religious test. Major Thomas Lusk said that, "he
shuddered at the idea that Roman Catholics, Papists, and Pagans might be intro-
duced into office, and that Popery and the Inquisition may be established in
America."' t5 6 Charles Turner gave an eloquent speech about the need he saw
for Christian religious and moral standards to pervade the country.' 57 At the
North Carolina ratifying convention, delegate David Caldwell, among others,
expressed similar concerns. 1
58
The important point here is that participants in the constitutional debate
comprehended that states and federal governments would operate indepen-
dently - exercising concurrent taxation powers, exclusive federal control over
foreign trade and immigration, and exclusive state power over domestic affairs,
tort law, manufacturing, property, agriculture, and religion. They also under-
stood that there would be spill-overs from activities within particular states. 1
59
Yet the federalists' enumeration of state powers reveals a specific decision to
reserve to the states considerable sway over matters that (1) affected the nation
as a whole or (2) impacted the operations of the federal government's powers.
Perhaps leaving individual states with final authority over such matters
was merely a concession to political reality. Then again, perhaps not. As mod-
em scholars (who sometimes seem to be just catching up to the Founders) have
156 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 148.
157 id. at 171-72:
But I hope it will be considered, by persons of all orders, ranks, and ages, that, without the
prevalence of Christian piety and morals, the best republican constitution can never save us from
slavery and ruin. If vice is predominant, it is to be feared we shall have rulers whose grand
object will be (slyly evading the spirit of the Constitution) to enrich and aggrandize themselves
and their connections, to the injury and oppression of the laborious part of the community; while
it follows, from the moral constitution of the Deity, that prevalent iniquity must be the ruin of
any people. The world of mankind have always, in general, been enslaved and miserable, and
always will be, until there is a greater prevalence of Christian moral principles; nor have I any
expectation of this, in any great degree, unless some superior mode of education shall be
adopted. It is education which almost entirely forms the character, the freedom or slavery, the
happiness or misery, of the world. And if this Constitution shall be adopted, I hope the Conti-
nental legislature will have the singular honor, the indelible glory, of making it one of their first
acts, in their first session, most earnestly to recommend to the several states in the Union the
institution of such means of education as shall be adequate to the divine, patriotic purpose of
training up the children and youth at large in that solid learning, and in those pious and moral
principles, which are the support, the life and soul, of republican government and liberty, of
which a free constitution is the body; for, as the body, without the spirit, is dead, so a free form
of government, without the animating principles of piety and virtue, is dead also, being alone.
s The discussion at the North Carolina ratifying convention appears in 4 ELLIOT, supra
note 1, at 199. Mr. Caldwell's speech is particularly offensive to modem sensibilities. He
stated, in part:
In the first place, he said, [the lack of a federal religious test] was an invitation for Jews and
pagans of every kind to come among us. At some future period, said he, this might endanger the
character of the United States. Moreover, even those who do not regard religion, acknowledge
that the Christian religion is best calculated, of all religions, to make good members of society,
on account of its morality. I think, then, added he, that, in a political view, those gentlemen who
formed this Constitution should not have given this invitation to Jews and heathens. All those
who have any religion are against the emigration of those people from the eastern hemisphere.
Id.
' This point has been developed also by Justice Clarence Thomas. See his opinion in
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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recognized, rectifying spill-overs through centralized regulation may cost more
than it is worth.' 60 If you are annoyed by your neighbor's dog barking, it may
make more sense to talk to your neighbor or do nothing at all than to call in the
cops.
The founding generation was concerned about liberty and the danger to
liberty that a too-centralized government would create.161 They also were con-
cerned about efficiency. A federal government strong enough to internalize
most externalities would be inefficient at best, and tyrannical at worst. 162
Rather than accept that cost, the framers reserved to the states the power to deal
with externalities by entering compacts with each other, subject to Congres-
sional consent. 163 If bargaining did not work, then they deemed it better to
suffer spill-overs than to suffer an all-powerful "consolidated" government.
Justice Clarence Thomas" 6  and Professor Richard Epstein1 65 have
observed that the Commerce Clause gives Congress authority to regulate "com-
merce" - not matters "affecting commerce" nor even matters "substantially
affecting commerce."' 66 The founders' enumeration of the powers of states
supports their view. That enumeration strongly suggests that the kind of inter-
dependence cited in Wickard v. Filburn 167 between agriculture and commerce
is simply irrelevant to the constitutional scheme. The framers knew all about
that interdependence, and they decided to reserve agriculture to the states any-
way. To be sure, you do not absolutely have to read the federalist "enumera-
tion" of state powers to understand that - neither Justice Thomas nor Professor
Epstein needed to do so, apparently - but examples always help us less-clever
country cousins to see the point.'
68
"6 RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 20-30 (1988). This point is
also recognized in Butler & Macey, supra note 1.
161 See, e.g., 4 Jensen, supra note 1, at 295 (Thomas B. Wait to George Thatcher) (Nov. 22,
1787) ("Otherwise State sovereignty will be but a name - the whole will be 'melted down'
into one nation; and then God have mercy on us - our liberties are lost.").
162 For example, the trade-off between dealing with externalities and the cost of too much
government is captured in the constitutional debate over the absence of a federal religious
power. Supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
163 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cf. 3.
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The drafters of the Constitution did not enumerate the reserved powers of
states in the document itself, choosing rather to rely on general implication and,
with adoption of the Tenth Amendment, general exception. However, the fed-
eralist supporters of the Constitution did "enumerate" many specific reserved
powers during the public debate leading to adoption. In effect, they represented
that enumeration as authoritative. Moreover, just as lawyers and judges
employ the principle of ejusdem generis to draw conclusions about the scope of
a general clause from a list of examples, so also the founders' enumeration of
reserved state powers offers us precious insight into the scope of state
authority.
Finally, the founding generation's list of state enumerated powers helps us
understand the Constitution's limit on federal powers. This enumeration sug-
gests that the Constitution does not vest jurisdiction over all arguably
"national" issues to the federal government. On the contrary, in order to avoid
the unacceptably high costs of centralized government, the Founders opted
deliberately to reserve exclusive jurisdiction over certain "national" concerns to
the states.
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